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ABSTRACT: Drawing from the recent Front Polisario judgments of the General Court (judgment of 10 
December 2015, case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union) and the Court of 
Justice (judgment of 21 December 2016, case C-104/16 P, Council of the European Union v. Front 
Polisario [GC]), the present Dialogue questions whether and to what extent international law limits 
the power of a State administering a non-self-governing territory to dispose of the latter’s natural 
resources. While in recent times we have seen a distinctive consolidation of international practice 
backed by a widespread expression of opinio juris pointing to the emergence of a customary rule 
substantially limiting the powers and rights over natural resources of States exercising authority 
over non-self-governing territories, elements of uncertainty remain as to the precise content of 
such rule and its coordination with concurring and potentially applicable legal regimes. It is also 
submitted that the recent judgment of the Court of Justice, while avoiding to rule on the matter in 
point, has reinforced the view that exploitation of natural resources in NSGTs shall be conducted 
with a full and substantial involvement of the representatives of the people. 
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I. The EU judiciary faced with the exploitation of natural 
resources in Western Sahara 
The judgments rendered by the General Court and by the Court of Justice in Front Poli-
sario are noteworthy in two respects.1 Firstly, after more than 40 years of Moroccan 
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administration of Western Sahara, for the very first time, a judicial body has been faced 
with and has addressed in the merits the Polisario’s claims concerning the exploitation 
of natural resources in Western Sahara by Morocco and third States and international 
organizations cooperating in such endeavour. Secondly, albeit with different arguments 
and reasoning, both the General Court and the Court of Justice have come to the con-
clusion that the 2012 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the Eu-
ropean Union and the Kingdom of Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation 
measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fisheries 
products (hereinafter “Liberalisation Agreement”) shall not apply to the territory of 
Western Sahara. Little surprise that Polisario has welcomed both judgments as histori-
cal victories in their quest for self-determination of the Sahrawi people. 
In terms of international legal issues raised by proceedings and by the ensuing judg-
ments, one stands out in the legal challenge brought by Polisario and yet, relatively under-
scrutinised in the two judgments: namely, the right and power of the State administering 
a non-self-governing territory (NSGT), whose people have not yet exercised their right to 
self-determination, to exploit its natural resources, such as gas and oil fields, other miner-
al resources, fisheries, forestry and agricultural products. While the General Court’s an-
nulment of the Liberalization Agreement as far as it concerned Western Sahara was based 
on the consideration that no adequate effort was made by the EU institutions to ensure 
that the exploitation of natural resources would benefit the local population, the judg-
ment of first instance rejected all challenges based on international law and came to its 
conclusion in the context of scrutinizing the way political discretion in concluding an in-
ternational agreement was exercised. The issue has not been directly considered in the 
judgment of the Court of Justice: according to the Court, any misconduct by the EU had to 
be based on the assumption that the Liberalization Agreement extended to Western Sa-
hara, an assumption that could not be sustained on the basis of a systematic interpreta-
tion of the agreement in light of other applicable rules of international law.2 
The present Dialogue examines the state of the art concerning the regulation under 
international law of the exploitation of natural resources in NSGTs, drawing significant 
insights from the EU practice of concluding agreements with Morocco allowing a coop-
erative effort in the exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara. 
II. Administrative powers and the exploitation of natural resources 
in non-self-governing territories  
A first conceptual clarification is in order. When we employ the expression “administrative 
power” with reference to a NSGT, such as Western Sahara, we indicate any governmental 
authority which is displaying full control and jurisdiction over the territory in question, re-
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gardless of the latter’s designation as “administering power” under Chapter XI of the UN 
Charter or as “occupying power” under the law of belligerent occupation. The choice to 
employ the category of “administrative power” for Morocco’s control over Western Sahara 
is warranted by the fact that Morocco cannot qualify as administering power under Chap-
ter XI and that its designation as occupying power is not uncontroversial.3 
The starting point in order to ascertain the “state of the art” in international law on 
the application of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in 
NSGTs – as well as sticking point in the arguments variably employed by the Commis-
sion, by States in the Council and by members of the European Parliament in arguing 
against or in favour of the conclusion of bilateral agreements applying to Western Saha-
ra and facilitating the exploitation of natural resources and trade in agricultural and 
fishing products – is the 2002 legal opinion rendered by the UN Legal Counsel concern-
ing the exploitation of natural resources in NSGTs, in particular in Western Sahara.4 The 
legal advice was issued upon request by the UN Security Council on the matter of the 
legality of the actions taken by the Moroccan authorities consisting in the offering and 
signing of contracts with foreign companies for the exploration of mineral resources in 
the seabed off the coast of Western Sahara. The UN Legal Counsel pointed to the signif-
icant evolution of international law on the matter, exemplified by a series of General 
Assembly (GA) resolutions, highlighting the shift from a general prohibition of exploita-
tion of natural resources in NSGTs towards a regime where international law only pro-
hibits “those economic activities which are not undertaken in accordance with the inter-
ests and wishes of the people of the territory and deprive them of their legitimate rights 
over their natural resources”.5 The UN Legal Counsel concluded that the exploratory 
concessions per se were not in violation of the right to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources of the people of Western Sahara and yet “if further exploration and 
exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of the interests and wishes of the 
people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the international law principles 
applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing-Territories”.6 
The UN Legal Counsel’s reference to the normative standards as developed in the 
practice of the GA seems essentially correct. Since 1995, the GA has adopted a series of 
resolutions on the regime regulating economic activities in NSGTs that corroborate the 
 
3 C. RUIZ MIGUEL, El acuerdo de Pesca UE – Marruecos o el intento español de considerar a Marruecos 
como "potencia administradora" del Sahara Occidental, in Anuario español de derecho internacional, 
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4 Letter from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, of 29 January 2002 
from, addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/161. 
5 Ibid., paras 21-24. 
6 Ibid., para. 25, emphasis added. 
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conclusions drawn by the UN Legal Office in 2002. In the latest resolution adopted on 6 
December 2016, the GA has re-affirmed  
“the value of foreign economic investment undertaken in collaboration with the peoples 
of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and in accordance with their wishes in order to 
make a valid contribution to the socio-economic development of the Territories, espe-
cially during times of economic and financial crisis” and “its concern about any activities 
aimed at the exploitation of the natural resources that are the heritage of the peoples of 
the Non-Self-Governing Territories […] to the detriment of their interests, and in such a 
way as to deprive them of their right to dispose of those resources”.7 
The GA is not calling upon States, especially administering Powers, to refrain from any 
economic activity in NSGTs as inherently prejudicial to the people’s permanent sovereign-
ty over natural resources; it is only prohibiting those which are detrimental to the inter-
ests of the population and disregard their wishes. The wording employed by the GA con-
siderable differs from that found in the resolutions adopted before 2002 in which “foreign 
economic investment” in collaboration with the administering power for the exploitation 
of natural resources in the NSGTs was cast under a wholly negative light and considered 
as an obstacle to the realization of the right to self-determination.8 It is also in tune with 
the provision of Chapter XI, in particular Art. 73 of the UN Charter, according to which 
administering powers undertake to promote the economic progress of the territories and 
peoples under their administration; the provision clearly stresses an active role by the 
administering powers, which is hard to reconcile with an understanding of international 
law as setting an absolute prohibition on the undertaking of economic activities in NSGTs. 
The fact that the above resolutions have been adopted with a large majority of States vot-
ing in favour, together with the fact that they have been adopted by the UN organ compe-
 
7 General Assembly, Resolution 71/103 of 6 December 2016, Economic and other activities which af-
fect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories, UN Doc. A/RES/71/103, paras 2 
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economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination, UN Doc. 
A/RES/48/46; Resolution 49/40 of 9 December 1994, Activities of foreign economic and other interests 
which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination, UN Doc. A/RES/49/40. The view that economic 
activities undertaken by Morocco and foreign States and actors are generally prohibited is still main-
tained in the recent Legal Opinion issued by the Office of the Legal Counsel and Directorate for Legal Af-
fairs of the African Union (Office of the Legal Counsel and Directorate for Legal Affairs of the African Un-
ion, Legal Opinion on the Legality in the Context of International Law, Including the Relevant United Na-
tions Resolution and OAU/AU Decisions, of Actions allegedly Taken by the Moroccan Authorities or Any 
Other State, Group of States, Foreign Companies or Any Other Entity in the Exploration and/or Ex-
ploitaion of Renewable or Non-Renewable Resources or Any Other Economic Activity in the Western Sa-
hara, 14 October 2015, www.au.int). 
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tent for matters of decolonization, is indicative of a widespread opinio juris backing the 
emergence of a rule under customary international law, which is direct expression of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
The practice related to the fisheries agreements between the EU/EC and Morocco, 
currently also challenged before the EU judicial institutions, is quite interesting in this 
respect as it shows that the normative standards expressed in the UN Legal Counsel 
opinion and in the practice of the GA, albeit with some degree of ambiguity, are applied 
in the current practice of States and international organizations. 
A protocol extending the 2006 Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) between Mo-
rocco and the European Community had been rejected by the European Parliament in 
2011 as it was considered too expensive for the EU, environmentally unsustainable, and 
not in compliance with the rights of the population of Western Sahara under interna-
tional law.9 In the resolution stating the dismissal of the protocol, the Parliament had 
called on the Commission “to ensure that the future protocol fully respects internation-
al law and benefits all the local population groups affected".10 
The rejection of the protocol in point was directly linked to the vexed question of the 
territorial scope of application of the FPA, namely whether the latter extended to the wa-
ters off the coast of Western Sahara, hence prompting the question of its compatibility 
with international law. Already in May 2006, Sweden had voted against the approval by 
the Council of the FPA following the consideration that the agreement did not take “into 
full consideration that Western Sahara is not a part of the territory of Morocco under in-
ternational law […]”; and that “all concerned [were] not ensured to benefit from the im-
plementation of this agreement in accordance with the will of the people of Western Sa-
hara, as provided by international law” (emphasis added). Similar concerns, regarding in 
particular the implementation of the FPA, had been put forward by Finland and the Neth-
erlands in their statement of abstention.11 The decision of the Council to eventually ap-
prove the FPA, and the positive opinion expressed by the Parliament, had been signifi-
cantly influenced by the positive legal advices of the respective Legal Services. 
According to the Parliament’s Legal Service, the agreement did not exclude, nor in-
clude, the waters of Western Sahara, and, in any case, it would be the duty of Morocco 
to comply with its international obligations vis-à-vis the people of Western Sahara; the 
Community could eventually enter into consultations with a view to suspending the 
agreement, should the implementation by Morocco have disregarded the interests of 
 
9 Regulation (EC) 764/2006 of the Council of 22 May 2006 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partner-
ship Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco. 
10 European Parliament Resolution P7_TA(2011)0573 of 14 December 2011 on the future protocol 
setting out the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, para. 9, emphasis added. 
11 E. MILANO, The New Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and Moroc-
co: Fishing too South?, in Anuario español de derecho internacional, 2006, pp. 413-457, footnote 61. 
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the local population.12 In 2009, as a result of several parliamentary questions presented 
by MEPs, the Commission “disclosed” the first data revealing that the fishing licenses 
issued by the Moroccan authorities, and distributed to the fishing operators through 
the Delegation of the European Commission in Rabat, extended also to fishing areas off 
Western Sahara’s shores. After this revelation, the Committee on development of the 
EU Parliament asked the Parliament’s Legal Service for a new legal opinion. In the doc-
ument, issued on 13 July 2009, the Legal Service acknowledged the extension of the 
scope of application of the FPA to the waters of Western Sahara. It also maintained that 
there was no evidence that the EU financial contribution had been used for the benefit 
of the Sahrawi population. As the EU (back then European Community) is bound by the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the EU should have resorted 
to the implementation mechanisms envisaged by the EC-Morocco joint committee in 
order to ensure that the local population would actually take advantage from the Euro-
pean financial contribution. Had these conditions not been met, the EC should have re-
frained from requesting further fishing licenses in the waters of Western Sahara or 
should have suspended the FPA.13 The legal opinion in point was decisive in leading the 
Parliament to reject the provisional protocol in December 2011. Within the Council, 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands decided to cast a negative vote against the pro-
tocol, while United Kingdom, Cyprus, Austria and Finland abstained, because of the po-
tential breaches of international law. 
As far as the 2013 protocol is concerned – which has eventually been concluded 
and is currently into force –, the Commission has followed through the invitation of the 
Parliament to negotiate and draft a new protocol in full compliance with international 
law, in particular through the strengthening of implementation mechanisms concerning 
the European financial contribution outreach in regard to the development of fishing 
industry and of the coastal population in general.14 For that purpose, Art. 1 of the Pro-
tocol sets out a new provision: the protocol shall be implemented in compliance with 
the democratic conditionality clause and with human rights, as provided for by Art. 2 of 
the Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco.15 These adjustments have 
 
12 Legal Opinion by the European Parliament’s Legal Service of 20 February 2006 regarding the Pro-
posal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Eu-
ropean Community and the Kingdom of Morocco – Compatibility with the principles of international law, 
SJ-0085/06, D(2006)7352, para. 45. 
13 Legal Opinion regarding the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and 
the Kingdom of Morocco by the European Parliament’s Legal Service, 14 July 2009, SJ 0269/09, D(2009)37828. 
14 Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing oppor-
tunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement, in OJ L 328 of 12 
July 2013. 
15 Art. 2 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Commu-
nities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, in OJ L 70 
of 18 March 2000. 
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not been found fully persuasive by some States within the Council: Sweden and Den-
mark have voted against; Finland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands abstained. 
The declaration of the Dutch representative is particularly significant in this regard:  
“The protocol does not explicitly refer to the Western Sahara, but allows for its applica-
tion to maritime areas adjacent to the Western Sahara that are not under the sovereign-
ty or jurisdiction of Morocco. Morocco, as the administering power of the Western Saha-
ra, may not disregard the interests and wishes of the people of the Western Sahara, 
when applying the protocol to such maritime areas. The Netherlands notes that the pro-
tocol does not contain any provision ensuring that Moroccan authorities will use the 
amount paid for access to the resource in accordance with their obligations under inter-
national law owed to the people of Western Sahara. The Netherlands considers that, un-
der international law, a proportionate share of this amount should benefit the people of 
the Western Sahara. Compliance with international law will therefore depend on the im-
plementation of the protocol by Moroccan authorities”.16 
Support for the proposition that exploitation of natural resources shall be conduct-
ed for the benefit of the population and in accordance with its wishes can also ben 
found in the UN Secretary General (SG) report of 10 April 2014, concerning the situation 
in Western Sahara. The document stated that  
“Moroccan and international investments in the part of the Territory under Moroccan 
control, as well as in the territorial waters adjacent to Western Sahara, were the subject 
of contention between Morocco and the Frente Polisario, given the longstanding status 
of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. A new protocol of the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco was 
signed in the final quarter of 2013 and came into effect in February 2014, following ratifi-
cation by Morocco. The Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario wrote to me repeatedly 
to condemn Morocco’s exploitation of the Territory’s resources and publicly announced 
his intention to consider a possible judicial appeal against the Agreement”.17  
The SG mentioned information received from Front Polisario about the extension of 
the contracts between Morocco and foreign oil companies to explore the continental 
shelf of Western Sahara, recalling the 2002 legal opinion and quoting the passage re-
garding the need to respect the interests and wishes of the people.18 
 
16 General Secretariat of the Council, Proposal of 13 December 2013 for a Council Decision on the 
conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the protocol between the European Union and the King-
dom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fish-
eries Partnership Agreement in force between the two parties, UN Doc. 17194/13, ADD 1 COR 1, PECHE 
590 (emphasis added). 
17 Security council, Report of the Secretary General of 10 April 2014, on the situation concerning 
Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2014/258, para. 11. 
18 Ibid., para. 12. 
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III. “Grey areas” and unsettled issues  
Despite the substantial practice and expression of opinio juris pointing to the emer-
gence of a rule of customary international law prohibiting economic activities which are 
not undertaken in the interest and in accordance with the wishes of the people inhabit-
ing a NSGT, some grey areas and unsettled issues still remain.  
First of all, as the UN Legal Counsel conceded in 2002, recent instances of State prac-
tice supporting the emergence of a customary international law standard “have, for obvi-
ous reasons, been few and far apart”.19 The UN Legal Counsel has mentioned the Spanish 
exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara in the final phase of its administra-
tion, UN practice towards South Africa’s administration of Namibia and UN practice in East 
Timor concerning the joint exploitation of natural resources in continental shelf in coop-
eration with Australia.20 The most recent practice related to Western Sahara, as already 
highlighted, surely contributes to the consolidation of the standard. Also US, French and 
British economic policies in NSGTs are officially based on the need to act as trustees for 
the local population in consultation with local institutions. Moreover, remaining NSGTs 
are few and it is not surprising that the instances of State practice are limited; on balance, 
the expression of opinio juris is likely to play a more prominent role in the consolidation 
of the relevant customary rule. Hence, it is submitted that the real grey area is not so 
much the limited instances of practice, but the fact that the relevant GA resolutions titled 
“Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-
Governing Territories” have been regularly met with the opposition of Israel and the Unit-
ed States, with France and United Kingdom regularly abstaining, the three latter countries 
currently administering a great majority of NSGTs.21 The few public statements that can 
be found by the delegates of the three countries in the work of the GA are critical of the 
general attitude and the “anti-colonial” rhetoric employed by the Special Committee on 
Decolonization, rather than on specific normative standards, and yet the fact remains that 
their opinio juris is absent in the practice of the GA.22  
A degree of ambiguity can also be found in the requirement that exploitation shall 
be conducted “in collaboration and in accordance with the wishes” of the people. In a 
much quoted passage of the UN Legal Counsel 2002 opinion, the Counsel stated that 
“State practice, though limited, is illustrative of an opinio juris on the part of both adminis-
tering Powers and third States: where resource exploitation activities are concluded in 
Non-Self-Governing Territories for the benefit of the people, on their behalf, or in consulta-
tion with their representatives, they are considered compatible with the Charter obliga-
 
19 Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, cit., para. 18. 
20 Ibid., paras 18-20. 
21 The three countries administer 14 out 16 remaining NSGTs on the list of the UN. The list also in-
cludes Western Sahara. 
22 E.g. UN Doc. A/53/PV.78. 
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tions of the Administering Power, and in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions 
and the principle of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ enshrined therein”.23 
The use of the apparently disjunctive “or” has provided interpretative room for EU 
institutions and some Member States in emphasizing the element of the “benefits” for 
the population of Western Sahara, neglecting the need to hold consultations with the 
legitimate representatives of Sahrawi people, stemming from the obligation to ensure 
that economic activities are “in collaboration with them” and “in accordance with their 
wishes”. For instance, the Legal Service of the Parliament, in the legal advice rendered 
to the Committee on Fisheries in November 2013, has underlined the obligation under 
international law that the FPA and related protocols are implemented in a way that will 
bring about benefits for the Sahrawi population.24 In the joint declaration of vote issued 
by Austria, Germany and Ireland, the three countries have asked the Commission to in-
form the Council on the income resulting for the population of Western Sahara from 
the application of the agreement and to ensure that an appropriate quota is dedicated 
to that effect in line with the interests of the local population.25 During the debate in the 
parliament regarding the vote on the protocol, the Commissioner on fisheries, Maria 
Damanaki, has stated the following:  
“I would like to make one point very clear: no legal authority until now – including the 
United Nations, the European Court of Justice or the Legal Services of any of the EU insti-
tutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) – has ever said that an agreement with 
Morocco covering Western Sahara is illegal. Nobody. What they do say – and rightly so – 
is that such an agreement must fulfil certain conditions; in particular, referring to the 
fisheries agreement, that fishing activities must benefit the local population”.26  
Even the General Court, when addressing Front Polisario’s request for annulment 
based on the lack of consultation during the EU legislative procedure, has stated that 
international law does not impose any obligation to that effect.27 When identifying the 
failure of EU political institutions to keep into account the rights of the local population 
of Western Sahara, it has not mentioned the need to act in accordance with their wish-
es.28 The importance of acquiring the consent of the Front Polisario is instead men-
 
23 Letter from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, of 29 January 2002, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council cit., para. 24. 
24 Legal Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament, regarding the Proposal for a Coun-
cil Regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Commu-
nity and the Kingdom of Morocco – Compatibility with the principles of international law, 4 November 
2013, SJ 0665-13, D(2013)50041. 
25 General Secretariat of the Council, Proposal for a Council Decision, Doc. 17194/13, cit. 
26 European Parliament debate on North-East Atlantic: deep-sea stocks and fishing in international 
waters – Status of the North-East Atlantic mackerel fishery, CRE 09/12/2013. 
27 General Court, Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, cit., para. 138. 
28 Ibid., paras 223-247. 
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tioned in the part the judgment of the Court of Justice dealing with the application of 
the pacta tertiis principle to reinforce the conclusion that the Liberalization Agreement 
cannot be interpreted to include the territory of Western Sahara.29 
Already in 2008, Corell had criticised the misuse of the 2002 opinion by the Europe-
an Commission to justify the conclusion of bilateral fisheries agreements under interna-
tional law without the involvement of Front Polisario. Corell had declared:  
“I find it incomprehensible that the Commission could find any such support in the legal 
opinion, unless, of course, it had established that the people of Western Sahara had 
been consulted, had accepted the agreement, and the manner in which the profits from 
the activity were to benefit them. However, an examination of the agreement leads to a 
different conclusion”.30  
Corell also underlined the need to hold consultations and to find an agreement 
with the representatives of the population. In a more recent speech, published in 2017, 
he has further elaborated on the requirements entailed in his opinion:  
“[…] if you are to use the resources of a Non-Self-Governing-Territory for the benefit of 
the people, this is the first condition: it has to be for the benefit of the people, and you 
have to be able to prove that. You have to consult with them or their representatives, 
whoever it is depending on the situation in the decolonization as it were. And then you 
have to also realize that it has to be done either on behalf of or in consultation with rep-
resentatives of the people. What do I mean by ‘on behalf of” that I draw from resolutions 
by the General Assembly over the years? This means that they must have come so far in 
the decolonization process that they have a representative body that can decide to hand 
over and ask an administering power to deal with this matter and to sell for their benefit 
resources from the territory”.31 
There is a strong case to be made that the EU attitude on the matter has been dic-
tated by reasons of political convenience and opportunism. It was unthinkable that Mo-
rocco could agree to an economic deal, which involved, even though only through con-
sultation, Front Polisario. The emphasis on the element of the benefit for the “local 
population”, rather than the “people” of Western Sahara, has also to do with “realities 
on the ground”: namely, that most of the population currently living in Western Sahara 
has been settled from Morocco in the last decades, with most of the original Sahrawi 
living in the Algerian refugee camps of Tindouf. Be that as it may, the fact remains that 
the practice emerging from the EU/Morocco international agreements casts a shadow 
 
29 Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario [GC], cit., para. 106. 
30 H. CORELL, The Legality of Exploring and Exploiting Natural Resources in Western Sahara, Confer-
ence on Multilateralism and International Law with Western Sahara as a Case Study, Pretoria, 4-5 Decem-
ber 2008, www.havc.se, p. 242. 
31 H. CORELL, The Principle of Sovereignty of Natural Resources and its Consequences, in M. BALBONI, G. 
LASCHI (eds), The European Union Approach Towards Western Sahara, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2017, p. 131. 
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over the adherence to and the compliance with the requirement of consultation, even 
in a case in which the people do have a representation with an international standing. 
Also, consultation does not equal consent: practice and the 2002 UN Legal Opinion are 
inconclusive as to whether the representatives of the people must express consent to 
any exploitation of natural resources or whether any involvement in the decision-
making process is in itself sufficient to fulfil the international requirement.  
Another relatively unsettled issue in State practice is that of the coordination be-
tween the legal regime of NSGTs and that of belligerent occupation. The 2002 UN Legal 
Opinion does not shed light on the possible intersection between the two regimes. This 
is what Corell had to say in 2008 with regard to the relevance of the law of occupation in 
the case of Western Sahara:  
“In preparing for the formulation of the opinion I had my collaborators look at several 
options. Among those was certainly the option of basing the opinion on the laws of oc-
cupation, all the more so since I had officers with particular expertise in this matter in 
my Office. However, in view of the way in which the UN had addressed the situation in 
Western Sahara and the result of the various analyses, I came to the conclusion that the 
best way to form a basis for the legal opinion was to make an analysis by analogy taking 
as a point of departure the competence of an administering Power. Any limitation of the 
powers of such entity acting in good faith would certainly apply a fortiori to an entity that 
did not qualify as an administering Power but de facto administered the Territory”.32 
Regardless of the application of the law of belligerent occupation to a situation such 
as Western Sahara – an application that is highly dependant upon the controversial 
proposition that the conflict was internationalized at its very outset in the 1970s –, the 
conclusion of the UN Legal Counsel seems essentially correct. The law pertaining to 
NSGTs is lex specialis with regard to any occupation of the territory as it is specifically 
targeted at regulating a specific decolonization context and ultimately aimed at a higher 
level of protection of the people inhabiting the territory. Even assuming, for instance, 
that the rules of usufruct under Art. 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations would in princi-
ple apply where an international conflict has taken place,33 such broad rules should be 
interpreted in conformity with the other obligations incumbent upon the administrator, 
including those deriving from the specific status of the occupied territory and from the 
principle of self-determination: hence any exploitation of natural resources should be 
conducted for the benefit of the people and in consultation with their representatives, 
once a political representation is in place. Even in a case of traditional inter-state con-
flict with the clear application of the law of belligerent occupation, such as the Anglo-
American occupation of Iraq between 2003 and 2004, the UN Security Council in Resolu-
 
32 H. CORELL, The Legality of Exploring and Exploiting Natural Resources in Western Sahara, cit., p. 238. 
33 Art. 55 of the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regu-
lations concerning the Laws and Customs of War (The Hague Regulations), adopted on 18 October 1907.  
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tion 1483, after recalling in the preamble “the right of the Iraqi people freely to deter-
mine their own political future and control their own natural resources”, unanimously 
endorsed the establishment of a Development Fund to which most proceeds from ex-
port of oil and gas resources should be transferred, the Fund being directed “to meet 
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair 
of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi 
civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq”;34 in the 
subsequent Resolution 1546 it decided that an additional voting member should be 
added in the International Monitoring and Advisory Board to include a representative of 
the Iraqi Interim Government.35 
Finally, another issue of regime coordination can arise with regard to the regime of 
non-recognition of situations produced by gross violations of peremptory norms. In this 
latter respect, one must underline that the problem of regime coordination has to do 
with the rights and obligations of third parties, rather than powers and obligations of 
the administrative authority. And yet the alleged existence of an absolute prohibition 
upon third parties to conclude agreements with the administrator, when the relevant 
territorial situation is deemed to be consequential to a gross violation of peremptory 
norms, inevitably curtails the possibility of the administrator exercising its powers with 
regard to the NSGT. To put it simply with regard to Western Sahara: even if the Moroc-
can authorities, in cooperation with the EU, were to devise a mechanism of full consul-
tation of the Sahrawi representatives with the aim of transferring the proceeds of any 
economic activity to the local population, the EU in concluding such agreement may be 
found in violation of its obligation of non-recognition under general international law.36 
A practical deal specifically benefitting the local population would likely fall under the 
purview of the so-called “Namibia exception”, according to which the non-recognition of 
the legality of a territorial situation should not result in the depriving the people of the 
territory of any advantages derived from international cooperation. In particular, the ICJ 
famously stated that “invalidity […] cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for in-
stance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ig-
nored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory”.37 However, it is hard to 
believe that any international economic agreement, extending to Western Sahara, how-
ever beneficial to the people of the territory, could fall under the above exception, as it 
would clearly imply a right to act internationally on behalf of the territory despite the 
alleged gross violation of a peremptory norm. 
 
34 Security Council, Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003), preamble and para. 14. 
35 Security Council, Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004, UN Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004), para. 24. 
36 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South-
Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory 
opinion of 21 June 1971, p. 56. 
37 Ibid., p. 55. 
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As rightly shown by Kassoti, the obligation in point has been clearly circumvented 
by the General Court, when it has asserted that no obligation under international law 
prevents a State from concluding an international agreement with a third party with re-
gard to a “disputed territory”.38 The possibility of “circumvention” is magnified by the 
fact that absent a mechanism of authoritative third-party determination for the trigger-
ing of the obligation of non-recognition, outside those rare instances in which it is the 
Security Council to determine a gross violation of peremptory norms (e.g. Iraq in 1990 
or Namibia in 1970), it is in the hands of each State or international organization to 
make its own legal qualification of a given territorial situation.39 
IV. Of the uncertainty principle and of Voelkerrecthsfreundlichkeit 
In his famous enunciation of the “uncertainty principle” in 1927, Werner Karl Heisenberg 
revolutionised quantum mechanics in pointing to the impossibility of detecting with cer-
tainty the position in space and time of atomic particles.40 The more accurate the meas-
urement of the position in space of the particle, the more indeterminate the moment in 
time in which such position was achieved; and vice versa. The “uncertainty principle”, mu-
tatis mutandis, often applies when ascertaining the content of customary international 
law. The more opinio juris becomes precise in determining the scope an obligation arising 
under customary international law, the more State practice is led to depart or deviate 
from the normative standard. On the other hand, identifying a core of sufficiently wide-
spread and consistent State practice often entails watering down the expression of opinio 
juris and hence the normative content of the customary rule. The rule conditioning the 
rights and powers of States administering NSGTs is a good case in point. On balance, 
there is increasing support in the opinio juris of States and international organizations 
towards the consolidation of a rule of customary international law prohibiting exploitation 
of natural resources contrary to the interests and wishes of the people, with State practice 
generally supporting the rule, but with important deviations as to the involvement and 
consultation with the representatives of the people and extent thereof. 
One could not reasonably expect the General Court or the Court of Justice to cast 
definitive light over such a complex issue of international law. The CJEU is generally 
concerned with upholding and guaranteeing the consistency and coherence of the EU 
 
38 E. KASSOTI, The Front Polisario v. Council Case: The General Court, Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit and 
the External Aspect of European Integration (First Part), in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No 1, 
www.europeanpapers.eu, pp. 352-353. 
39 S. TALMON, The Duty Not to ‘Recognize as Lawful’ a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or 
Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation without Real Substance?, in C. 
TOMUSCHAT, J. THOUVENIN (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and 
Obligations Erga Omnes, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006, p. 99. 
40 D. CASSIDY, Uncertainty: The Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman 
& Co, 1994. 
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legal order, rather than contributing to the development of international law or project-
ing the image of the EU as a Voelkerrechtsfreundlich actor. And yet it is submitted that 
the judgment of the Court of Justice is an important milestone in the search for justice 
of the Sahrawi people and should be seen as ultimately Voelkerrechtsfreundlich. The 
Court of Justice has clearly and strongly reaffirmed Western Sahara’s distinct territorial 
status, the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi people and the erga omnes nature 
of such right.41 Most importantly, it has affirmed the need to acquire the consent of the 
people of Western Sahara and its representatives in decisions affecting their rights and 
interests.42 In this latter respect, one can see a strong interpretation of the principle of 
involvement and consultation (requiring consent) entering through the back door and 
reinforcing the international norm that exploitation of natural resources in a NSGT, 
however legally framed, is an activity that, while not generally prohibited, shall be con-
ducted in the interest and according to the wishes of the people. 
 
41 Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario [GC], cit., paras 88-92. 
42 Ibid., para. 106. 
